

# The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro: A study in leadership and innovation<sup>1</sup>

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## 1. The problem

Drug dealers have dominated sizeable areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro almost since the 1980s. At the 2000's the problem emerges as the most challenging local public policy issue. Militias (a new criminal player in town) and drug dealers were able to prevent regular policing at important favelas and popular neighborhoods all around the city. The control over the territory has allowed them to make significant gains not only with drug trafficking, but also by performing other illegal activities, such as supplying cable TV services and by extorting businesses, especially public transportation companies. Dozens of policies designed to cope with the problem were put into action by the six State governments during the period 1986 to 2006 to try to solve the drugs and militia problem, without any success. A major federal intervention in the state in 1990 (Operation Rio) likewise failed.

Nevertheless, in 2008 an experiment significantly changed Rio's "criminal geography": 13 units of Pacifying Police (UPPs)<sup>2</sup> were established in districts and favelas which were controlled by traffickers and militias. 24 communities were pacified and, although the initiative affected only the city of Rio de Janeiro, the number of murders, armed robberies and lethal assaults fell on average 12% throughout the state between 2008 and 2012<sup>3</sup>. Regular policing has returned to former "no-go" areas. Police records also show an increase in the number of drug arrests and imprisonments in those areas. Favorable political circumstances enabled a well thought out plan of police intervention to be put into action, which ended the inertia caused by decades of ineffective policies, which had in effect handed over control of favelas and poorer areas of the city to organized crime. The central plank of the policy was very simple - Control of areas where there was a strong drug trafficking and militia presence had to be *regained* and replaced with a strong police presence. This policy of regaining control of areas was given priority over other urban and socio-economic initiatives, as without breaking the stranglehold of organized crime in certain regions, no public policy was likely to have much effect. The police force was reorganized to allow a permanent

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<sup>2</sup> Communities pacified by June 2012: Morro Santa Marta (Botafogo — South Area); Cidade de Deus (Jacarepaguá — West Area), Jardim Batam (Realengo — West Area); Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira (Leme — South Area); Pavão-Pavãozinho and Cantagalo (Copacabana and Ipanema — South Area); Tabajaras and Cabritos (Copacabana — South Area); Providência (Center Area); Borel (Tijuca — North Area); Andaraí (Tijuca); Formiga (Tijuca); Salgueiro (Tijuca); Turano (Tijuca); Macacos (Vila Isabel); São João, Matriz and Quietinho (Engenho Novo, Sampaio and Riachuelo); Coroa, Fallet and Fogueteiro (Rio Comprido); Escondidinho and Prazeres (Santa Tereza) and São Carlos (Estácio). Available in: <[http://upprj.com/wp/?page\\_id=20](http://upprj.com/wp/?page_id=20)>.

<sup>3</sup> Data from the Institute of Public Security (ISP). In 2011-2012 variation during the period January to May was considered.

presence in pacified areas and over the medium term (until 2016) the program will affect 22% of the population who live in favelas (1.4 million inhabitants - IBGE 2010). Before the UPP program was introduced, there was no guarantee that there would be enough security firepower to cover an area of this size. Emergency calls (190) went unanswered and even routine police work, such as the serving of warrants and criminal investigation often required the deployment of special police operations.

Evidence of the UPPs' success in controlling crime is becoming ever more apparent. The number of murders in the city of Rio between 2008 and 2012 fell by nearly 10% compared with the rest of the State (Table 1). Initial studies of the effects of the UPPs have shown that, for example, the price of real estate in pacified neighborhoods and adjoining districts has gone up. Neri (2011) estimated that rents went up by 6.8% in pacified districts when compared to the rest of the city. Frischtak and Mandel (2012) produced evidence that the improving crime rate after the introduction of the UPPs has had a disproportional effect on increasing the value of lower priced properties, which has helped to reduce the poverty gap between rich and poor neighborhoods. Another important result from the study is that after the introduction of UPPs, the price of property in neighboring districts went up between 5% and 10%, the murder rate dropped on average by 10% to 25% and robbery fell by between 10% and 20%<sup>4</sup>.

UPPs also seem to have had a generally positive effect on public security throughout the State. Table 1 shows how there has been a reduction in violent crime not only in the State capital itself, but that this has been more marked than in the State as a whole. Rio de Janeiro was the second most violent state in Brazil in 2000. With a murder rate of 51 per 100,000 inhabitants, it was behind only Pernambuco (54 per 100,000), but between 2007 and 2010 the rate<sup>5</sup> fell by more than 35% and is now below the national average (Waiselfisz, 2012, p.184).

Table 1

Variation in the number of homicides in the capital and the rest of Rio de Janeiro state

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<sup>4</sup> This study was already complete when the Brazilian Forum for Public Security published its preliminary survey of the effects of UPPs (2012).

<sup>5</sup> The murder rate in the State of Rio de Janeiro fell from 40.1 per 100,000 in 2007 to 26.2 in 2010.

Period	Capital	Rest of the State
2007-08	-1.4%	-10.8%
2008-09	3.2%	2.6%
2009-10	-23.9%	-14.4%
2010-11	-12.7%	-9.8%
2011-12 <sup>1</sup>	-13.7%	-5.0%
Annual Average Variation (2007-12)	-12.1%	-9.3%
Annual Average Variation (after UPPs)	-16.8%	-7.3%

Source: Instituto de Segurança Pública <http://www.isp.rj.gov.br>

(1) Comparison between January to May 2011 and January to May 2012.

This is not, however, a study of the impact of UPPs, but rather an evaluation, in the form of a case study, of the challenges faced by the leaders who formulated and carried out the policy of pacification. I attempt to describe the specific context within which the leadership which proposed the innovation was working. I also investigate the precise mechanism by which the downward spiral of crime was reversed and how, by looking towards the future, a range of different agents working within the criminal justice system were able to rethink the strategies that had been current in the previous 25 years of democratic government. The new empirical material used in the case study was collected during the two years that I was part of the team that advised the State government on the project " Helping the State Government of Rio de Janeiro improve public security", an initiative which was supported by the Brava Foundation and the Brazilian Competitive Movement.

This was a crucial moment in the evolution of public security policy in Rio de Janeiro, when various members of the government abandoned fossilized positions in favor of an intelligent strategy which allowed control to be regained over communities that had been taken over by drug traffickers and armed militias for more than two decades. I was given privileged access to a position from which I could observe the process of change brought about by the policy of pacification. Aspects of public policy which appeared to be in conflict became seen as complementary and began to work in harmony instead of discord. There was no need to rewrite federal or state law on public security, nor was there any necessity to overcome the many known weaknesses of the State police. We went a different way. The

political leaders charged with public security showed a rare ability to understand the changing aspirations of communities most hard hit by the presence of organized crime, and saw an opportunity intelligently to use the power of the state to break their grip. They used political resources which had formerly gone to waste to build successful strategies to reduce crime.

### *Institutional background*

This seismic political change came during the period of State government 2007-2008 (the year when the first UPP was introduced in Santa Marta). I will describe how the pacification policy was conceived and implemented by a small team of innovators within the Public Security Department at the State government of Rio de Janeiro lead by José Mariano Beltrame. In a number of ways it can be compared to what William Bratton did with the New York Police Department in the 1990s. Both José Mariano Beltrame and William Bratton were leaders who offered new approaches and new ways of thinking. Both had to deal with limited resources and an initially demotivated staff, as well as powerful vested interests and organizations who wished to preserve the status quo (Kim and Mauborgne, 2008). There are also similarities in the way both found influential and persuasive allies who supported their “coalition for change”.

The situation in which those who wanted a change of approach in Rio found themselves was very challenging. Both the criminal investigation service and the uniformed police were rife with corruption, salaries were low and facilities out-of-date. Almost a third of the uniformed police (PM) were working short time or absent on leave in 2008. In a popular survey, 92% of those questioned said they did not agree with the restrictions placed on the uniformed police and there was a similar figure for the criminal investigation department (87%) (Instituto de Segurança Pública, 2007).

Too often criminals were acting with impunity. The uniformed police made only 1,300 arrests per month on average between 2005 and 2007. Over a year this represents 102 arrests per 100,000 inhabitants. By way of comparison, the figure for São Paulo state during the same period was 217 arrests per 100,000 inhabitants<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> Sources- Public Security Department, São Paulo, Quarterly Statistics ([www.ssp.sp.gov.br/estatistica/plantrim](http://www.ssp.sp.gov.br/estatistica/plantrim)). Average number of arrests in flagrante between 2005 and 2007. Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, data collected in the course of the “Improvement in the management of the Public Security System” project, meeting 14/12.

Despite the fact that Rio de Janeiro was the sixth highest spender on public security in 2008 and ninth in 2010,<sup>7</sup> police salaries were among the lowest in the country and there were a number of structural problems within the organization: for example there was no internet or email connection and radio communications were unreliable. Clearly this material poverty had a series of negative effects on police work and relations with the public.

These were material constrains, but the pathway to innovation was also blocked by ideas and the status quo within the criminal justice system should be overcome in some way. In less than three and a half years<sup>8</sup>, the policy of pacification changed the traditional public security agenda and offered a new vision for the future. Let's see how this happened.

### *Organized crime's control of territory*

Rio de Janeiro has a number of features untypical of cities in South America. Organized criminal militias were able to control the access, movement and community life in a major part of the city. How could they do this? The presence of drugs – and its network of distribution – is a major factor to consider. However, the city is quite far from the principal drugs producers on the continent (the Andean countries and to a lesser extent, Mexico) and is not on an important trafficking route to Europe or the USA. Neither is it a city dominated by any significant culture of drugs use<sup>9</sup>.

Until the end of the 1990s only the Colombian cities of Cali, Bogotá and Medellín had a criminal geography similar to that of Rio, but they are at the center of the world's major cocaine producing region, where there is a guerilla movement that has flourished for 50 years and a continual flow of illegal arms. In such a situation, criminal groups usually have sufficient resources to corrupt the police and dominate the large areas of the city where they operate. But why was Rio also like this? Why did Rio, which was distant from any centers of production or any main smuggling routes, have so many areas under gangs' control?

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<sup>7</sup> Per capita spending in Rio in 2008 was R\$309.00 compared with R\$ 218.40 in São Paulo according to the Brazilian Forum for Public Security Annual Report 2009, Table 7. The 2011 report shows updated figures for 2010 (Table 13) and a relative decline of Rio de Janeiro State's position. Per capita spending fell to R\$ 244.81 and the state to tenth position.

<sup>8</sup> The first UPP was introduced in November 2008 in the Santa Marta favela.

<sup>9</sup> Available drug use surveys with the populations shows that cities like Santiago, Buenos Aires, São Paulo and Brasilia have much higher rates of use, especially among those of school age (Cicad, 2008; UNODC and Cicad, 2006).

My hypothesis is that, in order to understand how this complex situation came about, it's necessary to take into account at the first place the design and implementation of crime control policies and the way the local criminal justice works<sup>10</sup>.

The answer may be found in the chronic inefficiency of the State criminal justice system. It was this that was at the core of the long-term crisis and also at the center of the innovations which we are going to analyze. The policy of pacification is extremely relevant to the public security crisis because it goes to the heart of the criminal justice system and challenges the options and accommodations that were being made over the long period of the past three decades. It may be that, rather than any special structural characteristics, such as inequality, poverty or poor urban infrastructure, the public security crisis in Rio de Janeiro may be laid at the door of the political choices made by successive administrations and society itself.

## 2. The new political approach of the UPPs

The debate over public security before the UPPs centered around two main arguments. For reformers who supported the model of "democratic policing", crime would never be controlled without "restructuring" the police force to equip them for the task. This involved making considerable legal changes, with the aim of unifying police forces, improving levels of education, improving work conditions, introducing technology, widening internal and external checks etc. There could be no short cuts. Ultimately, only a democratically organized police force would be capable of beating crime.

For those who sought to "control" crime, it was the other way round. First the police had to cut the amount of crime, thereby increasing the amount of public support they got, and only then could they start upwards on a regenerative cycle which involved better education, infrastructure etc. These opposing positions were locked in conflict until the experiment of the UPPs showed a way out of the dilemma.

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<sup>10</sup> See the work of Misse (2007) and Zaluar (2004).

### *The extent of the policy of pacification*

The policy of pacification was centered around four basic aims - (1) police coercion was to be used against the armed criminal gangs that had taken over control of certain “territories” (2) police activity was to be raised to a level where it was no longer worth engaging in criminal activities (3) the police were to be granted a permanent presence in pacified communities (4) support was to be given by the police for policies of social inclusion being introduced by other agencies. These aims derived from and were directly inspired by the methods described by Nye (2011) when looking at the way the military uses its power in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The peacekeeping experiences in those countries have had a profound impact on military forces throughout the world and the way they confront their task (Nye,2011:43). In the specific case of the Brazilian military forces, these debates intensified and spread among the uniformed police mainly as a result of the experience of the Peace Force in Haiti. In Rio de Janeiro, the Army played a direct role in the occupation of the Alemão favela between December 2010 and June 2012. On average about 1,300 troops were deployed, 700 arrests were made and a number of drugs and weapons confiscated.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ministry of Defense: <[www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/](http://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/)>.

The four main foci of action described above, which formed the main platform of the policy of pacification, are represented in Diagram 1.

**Diagram 1**  
**The Extent of the Policy of Pacification**

**The Extent of the Policy of Pacification**

	CONTROLE		INCLUSÃO	
<b>NATURE of the ACTION</b>	Direct police coercion	Dissuasive power	Protection	Assistance and Development
<b>TARGET GROUP</b>	Drug traffickers, members of armed gangs and other criminals	Potential criminals and users of the security services	Population of the pacified communities	Population of the pacified communities
<b>IMMEDIATE AIM</b>	Retake of territory and render criminals inoperative	Strong police presence	Pacification	Expansion of social services and professional training
<b>QUALITIES NEEDED FOR SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY</b>	Tactical and operational - efficiency	Ability to maintain policing and credibility	Credibility with local residents	Ability to identify demands and communicate public policy to the local population
<b>RESOURCES NEEDED</b>	Special training, tactics, arms and equipment	Sufficient manpower, effective management and control of policing	Maintaining member and communication, political management of relations with pacified communities	Adequate budget and organization of technically capable institutions

*Source: adaptation from Nye, 2011; p 42: Table 2.1.*

*High impact police intervention*

To have a major impact, as for example by using special forces to recover territorial control, it's necessary a high level of tactical and operational competence. The immediate object of preventing members of organized criminal gangs from responding and exercising their power in the favelas and low-income neighborhoods. A major challenge at this stage was to define the areas in which intervention was to take place, a task in which the criminal investigation intelligence service played a major role. One of the major strengths of the action was that various sections of the police force worked effectively in unison in special operations in the favelas.<sup>12</sup> Before the policy of pacification such co-operation was rare.

<sup>12</sup> The task of BOPE (Special Forces) and Special Impact Unit of the Uniformed Police and the Core of the Criminal Investigation Service.

In the first two years of the Cabral administration, 2007 and 2008, the government's security policy was described as a "policy of confrontation" in the press and was described by Amnesty International as "draconian and aggressive".<sup>13</sup> An operation in the Alemão favela in June 2007 left 19 people dead, provoked hundreds of demonstrations in opposition, and even received a mention in Wikipedia.' There was a change in the way opinion makers and human rights activists reacted to police action at the time when it first became known as the policy of pacification. The interventions were seen as a specific tactical weapon, to be used as a temporary means of disrupting the organized gangs. However, the successful way the police handled operations made the program of pacification effective and gradually reduced the resistance of the gangs, who began to "surrender" to the police, in many cases peacefully, so that the uniformed police could set up a permanent presence in the areas it had reoccupied. The only exception was in the Alemão complex in 2010, but in general the policy of pacification succeeded in being seen as legitimate action in defense of the law and a successful assault on organized crime.

#### *The strong police presence as a means of dissuasion*

After the initial intervention a significant police presence was required to maintain control in the pacified communities. The aim was to make local residents see that the police presence was lawful and would also produce benefits. The challenge was to manage the police follow-up in such a way that it would use routine methods to restrain crime and respond to the public's requests, as well as develop a model of community policing that would be appropriate within the specific context of the pacified communities.

The strong police presence acted as a deterrent to potential criminals and gradually local residents came to accept it as the norm. What had previously been very cheap or free (cable TV and electricity for example) started having a market price. The police presence also enabled other regulatory agencies (construction standards, environmental, refuse collection etc) to operate. The extent to which the communities view these steps as positive is still open to debate.

In the second phase of the policy of pacification, different policing strategies were combined with the aim of controlling crime and attending to criminal emergencies. There is

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<sup>13</sup> SPECIALISTS criticize the Rio State government's policy of confrontation.. O Globo, newspaper 28 May 2008.

no single effective method of policing and it is within this context that the policy had to show its effectiveness in performing adequately, by reducing the length of time it takes to respond to emergency calls, increasing the activity of the criminal investigation branch, improving the way warrants are served or simply making the police presence felt, for example. The activity of the magistrates and the intelligence service was critical at this stage, as their presence was necessary in communities which would otherwise have had difficulty in effectively supervising police work. What happened was that cases of corruption within the major UPPs were reported and investigated directly by the uniformed police's own investigation service. The way such incidents were dealt with and the effectiveness of management systems were major factors in determining the success of the policy of pacification.

### *Protection and pacification*

Successful protection and pacification depends on the ability of police to take advantage of their success in getting rid of organized crime to re-establish public confidence in the way the police work. At this stage in the pacification process, the focus is no longer on crime as such, but on socially stabilizing communities. Crime has a pervasive effect. Reduced life expectancy, especially among the very young, has a direct consequence on individuals' long term aims and short term actions, especially over matters such as investing in education or saving for the future. In areas where there is a high incidence of violent crime, the young tend to think only short term and do not look towards long term benefits.

Conversely, the policy of pacification increased the cost of anti-social behavior and of actions directed only at short term gain, such as criminality, and sent out a message that investing in education, saving, lawful work and taking care of one's health (by avoiding early pregnancy, drinking, drug-taking etc) amongst others, may have long-term benefits throughout the rest of one's life. Thus by reducing the number of deaths caused by violent crime it is possible to get the disadvantaged young to see life with a less short term vision. Pacification makes society more equal by reducing the threat of violent death and this produces a positive ripple effect throughout society. In the short term, school attendance in the pacified areas went up. It will soon be possible to quantify the effect on educational performance and health, as well as other areas which depend on a strong level of social cohesion, which have been altered by the policy of pacification.

### *Broadening the role of social assistance and development*

The police can – and often do – perform a valuable role in social welfare and improvement, which clearly contributes to greater bonds of loyalty and confidence among the population. However, the road chosen by the policy of pacification has been to leave social initiatives to the care of specialized agencies. Social initiatives in reoccupied areas have assumed their own independence, and have become known as “Social UPPs” (Suska, 2012). By opening up discussion as to how the structure of public security can best contribute to other government initiatives, the Secretary of State for security has made a positive step towards creating a more generalized strategy of support for the changes that have taken place. There has not been sufficient time yet to estimate the impact of the policy on economic development in communities. It is reasonable to believe, however, that increased individual mobility and guarantees of the rights of property will have a positive effect on income.

Currently, public opinion is more kindly disposed to police intervention as part of a policy of pacification, however, and is beginning to see its positive results. This has been the best example of “soft power” of the UPPs.

### *The final analysis - a successful effort at change*

*Why was this new policy successful?* There is no shortage of failed efforts at changing security policy in Rio de Janeiro state. The policy of pacification put an end to this vacillation and broke down resistance to change. The way policing was allocated in the State was changed, along with the way it was conducted in communities with a high rate of crime. Economists and political scientists began to expect that successful results could be repeated. I do not think this is the case with the UPPs. Not only is the criminal problem for which a solution is being sought quite specific, the crucial factor, for me at any rate, seems to be an individual one that is not easy to recreate, namely the quality of leadership for the idea.

From an intellectual point of view it may be frustrating to conclude that a certain policy has been successful because of an intangible factor such as “quality of leadership”. But if we look at the concrete actions and objectives that were the driving force behind this leadership, it may be possible to draw up a blueprint that might enable them to be copied in

new situations. Beltrame and his team seem to have got it right in sticking to basic actions which guaranteed the success of the innovation.

The first step in the right direction was their ability to set priorities and display a sense of urgency in pursuing them. A social or political condition may, or may not, be seen as a problem. The policy of pacification passed its first test when it convinced the upper echelons of government that concrete action could be taken to take back control of areas that had been overrun by drug traffickers and armed gangs. If public security leaders who were directly involved in the process of change had not been able to produce concrete evidence that there was a crisis in State security, they would not have been able to influence the way it was seen by other agencies and the public. They would have failed in getting it to be seen as a problem. They were successful, however, and this formed the basis for effective policies in dealing with it. Beltrame and his team were able successfully to select out of the “soup of ideas” that existed about public security in Rio de Janeiro clear, consistent policies, which they were able to bring together as the policy of pacification.<sup>14</sup>

The second step in the right direction was the formation of a working coalition between the heads of the Public Security Department and the leadership of the Uniformed Police. Whenever change on this scale is contemplated there is always a risk that it will be torpedoed by political parties or groups of minority interests within the government itself. In the Brazilian system, where consensus is all important, governments have difficulty in adopting policies which may produce “losers”, even a minority, as they are often a broad coalition and there are many opportunities for a veto, because of the system of representation of vested interests. The police, human rights groups, community leaders, government representatives all have to be listened to.

It is particularly important to form a consensus when it is the Executive’s strategy to create security policy to deal with the problem of crime, as was the case in the initial phase of the policy of pacification, as the cost would fall directly on the police. They would be called into action, both workload and risk would increase and a change in mindset would be needed if new policing plans of occupation and pacification were to be implemented. To convince the government as a whole that this was the right way forward and overcome vested interests were the challenges that needed to be overcome.

The first hurdle was budgetary. In order to win over the treasury, the group behind the policy put forward a plan that was consistent with necessary infrastructure spending and the

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<sup>14</sup> The way the agenda was drawn up was inspired by the work of Kingdon (1984).

need to increase police numbers. In this task they were supported by some of the Finance Department's own staff. It was part of the strategy that some of the department's own finance experts should convince senior leaders that investing in the UPPs and implementing the plan were both feasible and doable. This worked, but support from other groups within and at other levels of the government still had to be found. By preparing the ground for the "social UPPs" the team behind the innovation showed that it was capable of creating a coalition broad enough to ensure success.

The third successful move was to define in as clear a way as possible the objectives of the policy of pacification and the challenges that would be faced during the initial stages of the confrontation with organized crime. The team behind the policy avoided one of the basic errors which had been made by almost the leaders in the 1980s and 1990s in successive public security crises. They did not underestimate the importance of public opinion; indeed saw it as part of the solution. When the population of Rio began to feel the effects of the wave of crime in the 1990s, leaders reacted in the most heavy-handed way possible, not because they thought this would solve the problem, but because they thought that was what the public and the media wanted. In a city where there are 60 murders for every 100,000 head of population and where 20% of the population suffer from theft or robbery every year (Cpdoc-FGV/Iser, 1997) it's reasonable to suppose that many feel extremely insecure and that fear of crime is widespread. However this perception, frequently paraded in the press and opinion polls, merely caused the governing elites to panic (Batista, 1994).

With no idea what to do about crime, all that was left to them was to denounce the "climate of fear". This was the only way they could prevent Rio society from descending into the "symbolic, politically motivated lynchings" that the media appeared to be demanding (Soares, 1996). To replace this with a viable model of community policing would also be a major step forward towards greater social participation in the field of security.

The communications strategy of the policy of pacification also moved in this contrary direction. Its objectives were stated clearly – to reoccupy the territory that had been lost to crime – and it was also stated openly what means and methods would be used. The objectives were clearly stated in unambiguous language – why and how, instead of analytical hyperbole.

The fourth step forward was to get rid of political obstacles and the opposition of vested interests. The police, the trade unions and other special types of associations in the field of public security<sup>15</sup> knew exactly how to make the government listen to them. These

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<sup>15</sup> As well as having their own police organizations the most active and coordinated bodies are those that represent the police (Sindepol-J and Adepol-RJ as well as police officers (AME-RJ and magistrates (AMAERJ),

groups tend to be *reactionary* in nature and tend to block change when they think it is not in their best interests.

In the Brazilian model of collective bargaining, representatives of interested bodies frequently meet with those of the government to decide important issues. The aim of these negotiations is to come up with a compromise between both sides, a consensus, through which policy can be implemented. What this system guarantees, in the eyes of its defenders (Schmitter, 1982), is a stable agreement, which permits both sides to ensure they get a piece of the cake. However, what tends to happen in this type of process is that, if the government wants to make a major change it will have to fight hard against those who wish to preserve the status quo or else be prepared to water down its proposals.

Beltrame and his team constantly came up against the reactive nature of the police bodies. Uniformed police representatives not unexpectedly took advantage of the moment to put forward their claims for better pay. These claims, accompanied by public demonstrations, although organized by the uniformed officers' association, AME-RJ, were openly supported by the Chief of Uniformed Police, and the Secretary of Security in January 2008 finally gave in, mainly as a consequence of his support. Thus, with one of the major vested interests overcome, the way was open for the new policy to be introduced.

These were the difficulties faced by the supporters of the policy of pacification and I have outlined the correct steps taken that I believe were essential for its success. Sending in the units of pacifying police broke the inertia of more than two decades of appeasement of organized crime. For the first time since the return of democracy in the 1980s, there was a public security policy driven forward with the strong support of society.

This case illustrates how even against a background of systemic institutional weakness, as represented by the Rio de Janeiro police force, good policies can bring positive results. For the success to be maintained it will have to survive a change of government. Will the police's newly found self-confidence be sufficient to carry it forward? The answer will come in 2015, but the innovation, by bringing together tough, targeted measures against crime with a policy of community policing, has certainly changed the debate in the country.

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lawyers and prosecutors (AMPERJ) and prison guards (The Union of Employees in the State Penal System of Rio de Janeiro).

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